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FOREWORD: THE ONCE "NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM" & ITS CRITICS*
Ronald K.L. Collins**
The first critic of the once "new judicial federalism" 1 is also the
person credited with being its "intellectual godfather" 2 -Hans Linde.
Back in the pristine years of this constitutional experiment, then Professor Linde warned: A state court cannot undertake "to evolve an
independent jurisprudence under the state constitution... by searching ad hoe for some plausible premise in the state constitution only
when federal precedents will not support the desired result." 3 Perhaps
his influence in this area is attributable to the fact that he is, in a certain sense, both critic and "crusader."
Of course, the claim needs to be explained.4 Even so, the larger
point remains: from the outset, there have been troubling tenets of the
"new federalism" which have made it quite vulnerable to criticism.
As this constitutional movement enters the close of its second decade,
scholarly criticism5 continues. It is that body of criticism which I will
Copyright 1988, R. Collins.
Visiting Professor of Law, American University (Washington, D.C.) and Temple
University (Philadelphia, PA); former law clerk to Justice Hans A. Linde, Oregon Supreme
Court.
1. See Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyondthe "New Federalism," 8
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (1985) [hereinafter Collins, Beyond the "New Federalism'] ("The
'new federalism' isn't new anymore.").
2. Toobin, Better Than Burger, NEw REPUBLIC MAG., Mar. 4, 1985, at 10, 11.
3. Linde, Without "Due Process' UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 146
(1970) [hereinafter Linde, Without "Due Process'i; see also Linde, Book Reviews, 52 OR. L.
REV. 325, 338 (1973) ("The selection of a state or federal ground of constitutional protection
should not be a choice of judicial taciics .... ").
4. What Linde opposed was the reactive or irresponsible use of state law. Unlike later critics,
however, he actively called for the systematic use of state law in a way that "give[s] as much
attention and respect to the different constitutional sources" and at the same time strives "for
some continuity and consistency in their use." Linde, Without "Due Process," supra note 3, at
146; see also Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
193-200 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 85 (1985); Maltz, False Prophet-JusticeBrennan and the Theory
of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988) [hereinafter Maltz, False
Prophet]; Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS 98 (1988)
[hereinafter Maltz, Lockstep Analysis]; Maltz, The Dark Side of State CourtActivism, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 995 (1985) [hereinafter Maltz, State Court Activism]; Teachout, Against the Stream: An
Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional
Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13 (1988); see also authorities cited infra notes 6, 7. An informative critique
of several of the points advanced by these critics is presented in McAffee, The Illinois Bill of
*

**
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consider, if only in a preliminary manner, in this Foreword to the
Washington Law Review Symposium on state constitutional law.
The central claims of the critics may be summarized this way:
(1) reliance on state law is largely, if not entirely, result-oriented in a
way that usurps the powers of the coordinate branches of state government; (2) such reliance is illegitimate in that it insulates certain constitutional decisions from federal review; (3) most rights-affirming
rulings simply cannot be squared with historical intent; (4) absent
clear historical or textual warrant, state law decisions which deviate
from federal standards are either illegitimate per se or illegitimate to
the extent that they are not the product of "neutral criteria" which
rely heavily upon historical and textual considerations; (5) variant
state constitutional rulings undermine the need for uniformity in decisionmaking; (6) the "new federalism" really does not further the goals
of federalism; and (7) state constitutional interpretation frustrates the
political process.
At the outset, it may be helpful to identify several of the premises
implicit in many or all of the above claims: (1) federal decisional law is
the analytical yardstick by which to determine the legitimacy of state
law decisions; (2) the ultimate constitutional responsibility for judging
individual rights claims ought to be delegated to the United States
Supreme Court; (3) historical intent should be given paramount jurisprudential weight at the state level; (4) state constitutional provisions
which are similar or identical to their federal analogues are functionally irrelevant; (5) in principle, there are no meaningful differences
between the various models of what has been called the "new federalism"; and (6) federal supremacy and minimum standards notwithstanding, uniformity as a norm is significantly more important in
constitutional law than in other areas of law. Obviously, a number of
these premises, like the claims to which they correspond, either overlap or closely parallel others. Accordingly, I will address both the
claims and the premises in a more general sense.
Since the early 1970's, what has troubled the critics of the once
"new judicial federalism" is the strategic use of state constitutional law
in a way that expands the rights domain while insulating such state
court decisions from otherwise adverse federal court review. For
example, this judicial "tactic" is most controversial when state courts
rely on both state and federal law to vindicate some uncertain claim of
Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 1, 33-87 (1987).
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constitutional right. Thus, Professor (now Dean) Scott Bice argued
early along that "[i]f a state court bases a decision on independent
state and federal grounds to gain [an] 'insulation effect,' its action is
illegitimate." 6 Similarly, California Attorney General (now Governor) George Deukmejian and Clifford Thompson complained:
Easily the most troubling and the least justifiable feature of the California Supreme Court's mode of state constitutional interpretation is its
"dual reliance" technique. By invoking the state constitution the court
insulates its decisions from federal judicial review; by simultaneously
invoking the Federal Constitution, the court effectively blocks popular
review through the initiative process.7
Clearly, what is really at issue here is "judicial restraint." The critics take scholarly umbrage at a form of decisionmaking that uses the
shibboleth of the "new federalism" as a device to push state judicial
power beyond its perceived constituted limits. For them the revival of
interest in state law is but another form of "result-oriented" jurisprudence, this time in the service of the cause of rights-maximization.
Assuming arguendo that such state constitutional decisions, even a
significant number of them, are expansive in a way that gives rise to
the charge of rule by judicial fiat, the real issue is: how do we determine them to be so? For most, if not all, critics of the "new judicial
federalism" this question is answered by reference to contemporary
Supreme Court case law. In other words, this relational focus posits
that national decisional law is the -proper and primary yardstick by
which to measure the legitimacy of state court rulings construing state
bills and declarations of rights. Thus, if a Kentucky court rejects a
federal decisional formula bearing on the law of search and seizure,
the state ruling is seen as presumptively (if not conclusively) suspect.
Of course, the critics allow for the presumption to be overcome if the
state court can muster up the requisite textual specificity, historical
support or "neutral criteria" to "Yustify" this deviation from federal
case law. Failing this, our Kentucky judges are likely to be branded
men 8 if they depart from federal law.
6. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750, 757 (1972).
7. Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the Calfornia
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 996-97 (1979). Of course, the latter assertion is not
quite true as evidenced by the passage of the so-called "Victims' Bill of Rights" initiative. See
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28.
8. With the exception of Court of Appeals Judge Judy M. West, no women currently sit on
the state supreme or intermediate appellate courts in Kentucky.
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However jurisprudentially suspect our hypothetical Kentucky decision might otherwise be, it should not be deemed so simply or primarily because it is not situated in the shadow of federal decisional law.
That is, the relational focus test is itself both ideologically biased and
analytically deficient. I say this for nine reasons.
First, the critics invoke the relational focus test in individual rights
cases only. The test does not appear to have any currency, at least in
the critics' view, outside of this sphere of the law. Hence, if our Kentucky court relied on its own law and announced a separation of powers standard different from the one articulated recently in Morrison v.
Olson,9 the critics' presumption of illegitimacy probably would not
attach. The same would be true if a state court charted its own course
in state antitrust law, this in the face of parallel federal statutory law
as interpreted by the Supreme Court. l° Likewise, what about home
rule? Should the thoughtful arguments later advanced in this issue by
Professor Michael Libonati,' 1 for example, be presumed valid or
invalid by virtue of their compatibility with the parallel federal allocation of powers principle set forth in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority? 12 To the extent that the relational focus test is
arbitrarily confined to the law bearing on individual rights questions,
the critics' test is itself vulnerable to the charge of result-oriented
jurisprudence.
Second, the critics almost uniformly remain silent in the face of
state constitutional decisions which produce results equivalent to
9. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
10. See generally Frank, Book Reviews, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 1345-46 n.36 (1985). This
principle of variation has been defended by government lawyers. See ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT:

HORIZONTAL MERGER

GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3 n.8 (Mar. 10, 1987) (on file with author); see also Barrett, Attorneys
General Flex Their Muscles: State Officials Join Forces to Press Consumer and Antitrust Concerns,
Wall St. J., July 13, 1988, § 2, at 21, col. 3.
And what about state administrative law, where state statutes may derive from the federal
Administrative Procedure Act? Are the state APAs to be interpreted in unison with their
national counterpart? For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Bonfield, State Law in the
Teaching of Administrative Laws: A CriticalAnalysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95,
103-35 (1982); see also LINDE, BUNN, PAFF & CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCESSES 458-563 (1981) (regarding differing federal and state delegated authority rules).
11. See Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism. 64 WASH.L REV. 51 (1989). The same
principles announced in the text hold true with reference to the student contribution to the home
rule question. See Comment, One Century of ConstitutionalHome Rule: A Progress Report. 64
WASH. L. REV. 155 (1989).
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). My point is not that the Garcia principle offers no guidance to state
judges considering home rule questions. Rather, the federal principle is not, and should not, be
held to be jurisprudentially determinative or even presumptively determinative. Consider
Libonati, Intergovernmental Relations in State ConstitutionalLaw: A Historical Overview, 496
ANNALS 107, 115 (1988).
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Supreme Court precedents, this even when the analysis employed in
the former is dubious. For example, in State v. Felmet,13 a public fora
access to shopping center case, the North Carolina Supreme Court
echoed the fourteenth amendment holding in Hudgens v. NLRB. 4
But the state court did so by a cavalier assertion that such expressive
activities amount to an unprotected "abuse" of expression under the
state constitution.1 5 This bold and bear assertion was all the court
offered. The result, though not the reasoning, obtained in the case
may be justifiable, 6 but it does not become so simply because the
result mirrors federal decisional law. Similarly, when the Idaho
Supreme Court' 7 elected to follow the Illinois v. Gates' 8 fourth amendment probable cause formula, it aligned federal and state law in the
face of a state statute codifying the Aguilar-Spinelli19 probable cause
standard. In different respects, both the North Carolina and Idaho
rulings are jurisprudentially objectionable. Yet insofar as they render
results identical to their federal counterpart, the handiwork of such
state judges does not suffer the critics' harangues. In other words,
"judicial activism," thus understood, is a label reserved for rightsaffirming but not for rights-denying state decisions. (Little wonder,
then, that in some quarters "expansionist" decisionmaking is the
expression preferred by the critics.) The relational focus employed by
13. 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1981).
14. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
15. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 provides: "Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the
great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained,, but every person shall be held
responsible for their abuse." The best discussion of the "abuse" provision may be found in an
Oregon line of cases leading up to State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569, 587-90 (1982).
16. Consider Cologne v. Westfarms Ass'n, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); Woodland v.
Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985).
As I view it, the state constitutional law problem with the "shopping center" line of cases is
essentially twofold: First, if there is warrant to dispense with "state action" in this area, what
principle should guide courts where claimants seek to set the requirement aside in other areas?
The most thoughtful examination of this general issue has been provided by Professor David
Skover. I say this even though I have some reservations about certain tenets of his thesis. See
Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A FundamentalRight to State
Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221 (1985). Second, there is the question (typically
overlooked or not analyzed) of protecting property rights as a matter of state constitutional law,
the constitutional texts of which are often facially more restrictive than the fifth amendment. See
Collins, Bills & Declarationsof Rights Digest, in THE AMERICAN BENCH 2520-23 (3d ed. 1985);
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 1, 9-10 (1981) [hereinafter Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions].
17. See State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 685 & n.1, 672 P.2d 561, 563 & n.1 (1983). But cf
State v. Painter, 296 Or. 422, 676 P.2d 309, 312-14 (1984).
18. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
19. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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the critics of the "new federalism" is well suited to this (result-conclusive?) enterprise.
Third, though there is division in the ranks, some of the more
modest critics hold that the relational focus, replete with its "neutral
criteria" test, 2 1 is only to be tapped when state law is relied upon to
expand constitutional protection beyond the national boundaries.
Hence, the test does not come into play where: (a) an equivalent level
of protection is given, even if for different reasons; or (b) a lesser level
of state law protection is recognized;2 2 or (c) where an issue arises
which has not been considered the Supreme Court; or (d) where the
text of the state law either has no federal analogue or where it is notably different from its federal counterpart. Under this jurisprudential
regime, the state constitution is divided into provisions of independent
and dependent staying power. 23 Textual differences render a provision
viable, while textual similarity renders a provision nugatory. 24 The
problem of the divided constitution does not alarm the critics of the
''new judicial federalism" who have their eyes trained on federal law.
Fourth, even if one concedes the value of the critics' "neutral criteria" in the state constitutional interpretive enterprise, the criteria typically tendered are importantly incomplete. The standard criteria the
critics suggest to justify divergence from federal case law are: Text,
history, structure, pre-federal precedent state decisional law; and local
traditions. 25 One missing criterion, of course, is analytical soundness,
20. Compare Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 986 (arguing that criteria should be
used to "determine whether a decision should be based upon federal or state constitutional
grants") with Hudnut, supra note 5, at 99 (arguing that criteria should be used to determine
"when to provide greater protection under the state constitution"). For the extreme view, see
Maltz, FalseProphet,supra note 5, at 443 ("[T]he decision by a state court to follow the lockstep
approach for resolving state constitutional claims reflects the view that there is no need for
additional judicial review when some judicial review exists already at the federal level."); Maltz,
Lockstep Analysis, supra note 5, at 101 (same). But see Collins, Reliance on State ConstitutionsThe Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1111-35 (1985); McAffee, supra note 5, at 51-75;
Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's 'Forced Linkage'
Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 676-82 (1987).
21. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 364-68, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-63, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 200-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1217-18 (1980) (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
See generally Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions supra note 16, at 17-18 & n.60.
22. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, supra note 16, at 15-16; Collins & Galie,
Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual
Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 327-28 (1986); Gormley, Ten Adventures in State
ConstitutionalLaw, I EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 29, 46-50 (1988).
23. For an elaboration of this point, see Collins, supra note 20, at 1117-23.
24. See id. at 1111-16.
25. If what the critics desire is "judicial restraint," this criterion is ill-suited to that end. The
criterion, to put it kindly, is troublesome to work with as a principle of law because its open-
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which at least includes the first four criteria. Consider this point in
light of the following hypothetical. Assume the year is 1966 and our
Kentucky court must decide whether its state search and seizure
clause26 should be limited to tangible items only. The state and federal
texts are virtually identical, the texts2 7 of both being patterned after
the Revolutionary-era Virginia and Pennsylvania Declarations of
Rights.2 8 As is often the case with such provisions, neither the structure of the state constitution nor the meager history of its bill of
rights2 9 offers any sufficient guidance. Likewise, local tradition is
ended potential makes it easily manipulable. Perhaps sensitive to this point, one critic recently
sought to discern a principle of tradition (a "constitutional attitude") from a state constitutional
text. In doing so, he drew on the following language, omitting, however, reference to the
italicized language:
[Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, industry[,] and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the
blessings of liberty, and keep government free[;] the people ought, therefore, to pay particular
attention to these points, in the choice of offlcers and representatives,and have a right, in a
legal way, to exact due and constantregardto them, from their legislatorsand magistrates,in
making and executing such laws as are necessaryfor the good government of the State
Teachout, supra note 5, at 46 (footnote omitted) (citing Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 18 [italicized language added]). On this occasion, and in the interests of brevity, I offer two interpretive points
counter to the narrowing ones given at id. at 47. First, the Vermont provision is concerned with

"principles" over particular historical conceptions. Consider R.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS

134-37, 148 (1977). This point may be of great consequence in the state constitutional interpretive process. See, eg., State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 434, 649 P.2d 569, 588
(1982) ("Constitutional interpretation of broad clauses locks neither the powers of lawmakers
nor the guarantees of civil liberties into their exact historic forms in the 18th and 19th centuries,
as long as the extension remains true to the initial principle."). Second, when the italicized
language is read in tandem with the language above it, it is not at all clear that the provision
counsels judges to be narrow-minded when vindicating rights in the name of "justice" or when
taking steps to insure that lawmakers and executive officials proceed with the requisite constitutional "moderation." See, eg., Skover, supra note 16, at 276-81. See generally 1 A. HOWARD,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 281-87 (1974); Jarrard, A Frequent
Recurrence to FundamentalPrinciples, (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
26. Ky.CONST. § 10.
27. As argued in note 29, infra, the critics of the "new judicial federalism" can be skeptical of
the kind of textualism that emphasizes the different wordings in state constitutions, wordings
which suggest protection beyond federal law. For one example of such text-based arguments, see
Feldman & Abney, The Double Security of Federalism:ProtectingIndividual Liberty Under the
Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 123-44 (1988). By the same token, the textualists do
have their doubts about the historical intent project. See, e.g., Boughey, An Introduction to North
Dakota ConstitutionalLaw: Content and Methods of Interpretation,63 N.D.L. REV. 157, 228,
241, 270, 272-79 (1987).
28. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 235 (1980) (VA. CONST. of
1776, § 10); id. at 265 (PA. CONST. 1776, § 10); see also B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF
MANKIND 88 (1977).
29. Because most state bills or declaration of rights clauses were borrowed without any or
much debate from other states, it is not unusual to find little or no helpful historical evidence at
the state level. See Collins, Litigating State ConstitutionalIssues: The Government's Case, 1
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONT. L. 201, 204-06 (1988) (journal published by the National
SERIOUSLY
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hardly determinative. Assume as well that at this point in time federal
fourth amendment law holds that the search and seizure clause applies
only to tangible items. As applied, the critics' "neutral criteria" would
outlaw state court reliance on the very kinds of arguments advanced
by Justice Brandeis in his famous Olmstead dissent.3" The point here
is not that state judges ought to adopt discarded Supreme Court dissents. Rather, there may well be times when the analytically sounder
argument is contrary to current federal precedent. 3 Analytical
soundness is not included among the critics' criteria probably because
it would sometimes prove incompatible with their rights-minimizing
view of law.
Fifth, most of the exponents of the relational focus view of things
either deny or discount the possibility of there being occasions when
state courts, properly relying on state law, may decline to incorporate
certain federal decisional law rules into the corpus of state law. 32 For
Association of Attorneys General, Wash., D.C.). And at the very least, history suggests that
most state bills and declarations of rights were intended to have independent force if only because
prior to incorporation "the protections of the federal Bill of Rights [had] 'no application' to the
states; 'they [were] restrictions upon the power of the United States; they [were] not restrictions
upon the states.'" Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 81 (1988)
(footnote omitted); accord Feldman & Abney, supra note 27, at 116.
I do not dismiss the usefulness of historical evidence as one criterion. Consider, e.g., McCabe,
State Constitutionsand The 'Open Fields' Doctrine:A Historical-DefinitionalAnalysis of the Scope
of Protection Against WarrantlessSearches of 'Possessions,' 13 VT. L. REV. 179 (1988). But see
Lousin, ConstitutionalIntent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record in Interpreting the
1970 Constitution, 8 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRO. 189, 214 (1975). Still, I sense that the critics

of the "new judicial federalism" attach far too much weight to it and in doing so: (1) they do not
understand how the state provisions came to be law; or (2) they do understand the latter but rely
on the historical criterion as a trump card to diminish the rights domain; or (3) they resort to
history as a way of circumventing the consequences of textualism (see note 27, supra); or (4) they
do not fully appreciate the shortcomings of determinative historicism. As to the last point,
consider the varying views of Schlag, Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283 (1985), and Utter & Larson, Church & State on the Frontier: The
History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 451, 478 (1988) ("The history of the establishment clauses of the Washington State
Constitution does not necessarily control current interpretation.").
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Olmstead
rule was abandoned by a 7-1 margin in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). For a
more recent example of the general kind of issue identified in the text, see State v. Campbell, 306
Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that police use of a radio transmitter attached to an auto
amounts to a search under state law).
31. See infra note 34. The same sort of considerations ought to inform examination of
various death penalty issues. Consider Comment, Washington's Comparative Proportionality
Review: Toward Effective Appellate Review of Death Penalty Cases Under the Washington State
Constitution, 64 WASH. L. REV 111 (1989).

32. See supra note 22. Professor Maltz, at least as of late, does not discount the possibility.
He even criticizes the proponents of the "new judicial federalism" for ignoring it. Maltz, False
Prophet,supra note 5,at 443-49, Maltz, Lockstep Analysis, supra note 5, at 103-06. In light of
my prior writings on this subject, see supra note 22, I am unsure why he takes issue with me or
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example, as matter of state law, some state judges may be hesitant or
unwilling to create jurisprudential shelter for substantive due process
or a commercial speech doctrine of the kind presently in place under
federal law. Though the texts of the corresponding guarantees may be
identical or similar, and- though history, structure and local tradition
may not provide a determinative answer, there nevertheless may be
sound analytical reasons for rejecting federal formulae. Relational
concerns notwithstanding, state courts should be willing to repudiate
logically unsound theories while interpreting their own law, provided,
of course, that they in no way abridge or interfere with any rights due
under the national Constitution. This point, among others, is made by
Professor G. Alan Tarr 3 in his useful contribution to this Symposium:
[B]ecause state judges can interpret their constitutions independentlywithout reference to federal... norms-they may conclude that state
constitutions require less, more, or the same level of separation of
church and state as is required under the federal Establishment
Clause.... [ThusJ the meaning of state provisions does not depend
upon the meaning of their federal counterparts.3 4
It is precisely that focus, sensitive to the concerns of analytical
soundness, that provides scholar and judge with the necessary tools to
formulate, for example, a satisfactory state constitutional jurisprudence of church and state.3 5 By contrast, the critics and the activists
they challenge both understand the state constitutional interpretative
what the difference is between us on this particular point. Furthermore, he does fault me for
criticizing an Oregon court plurality opinion which refused to incorporate the Miranda rule into
state law. Maltz, False Prophet,supra note 5, at 445; Maltz, Lockstep Analysis, supra note 5, at
103. My criticism of the Oregon plurality opinion, which is entirely consistent with my earlier
and current views, is not with the principle that the plurality could reject federal standards.
Rather, my complaint was that the more persuasive argument counseled otherwise. See State v.
Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 894 (1986) (Linde, J., dissenting); Collins, supra note 29, at 213-14.
33. Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1989).
34. Id. at 79. Justice Berkeley Lent of the Oregon Supreme Court recently made a similar
point in a unanimous opinion:
We note that there is no presumption that interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by
the Supreme Court of the United States are correct interpretations of Article I, section 9 [the
parallel Oregon clause].... Article I, section 9 and the Fourth Amendment have a common
source in the early state constitutions, but they have textual and substantive differences.
Even were the provisions identical, this court would nonetheless be responsible for
interpreting the state provisions independently.... Majority opinions of the Supreme Court
may be persuasive, but so may concurring and dissenting opinions of that court .... What is
persuasive is the reasoning, not the fact that the opinion reaches a particular result.
State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 n.7 (1988).
35. Without passing on the substantive merits of a recent church-state article authored by
Justice Robert Utter and Professor Edward Larson, their conclusions do comport with the
general principle advanced in the text. See Utter & Larson, supra note 29.
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process as essentially a one-directional venture. They differ, of course,
only in the directions to which they point courts.
Sixth, in those situations where either novel constitutional questions
arise or where there is uncertainty about the application of federal
decisional law, some critics would counsel state judges to forego
independent state law decisionmaking. The relational focus implores
state courts to rely on federal law in order that a matter may ultimately be considered by the nation's high court. The evil to be
avoided is "insulation" from federal review. Of course, this mindset
deprives state citizens of one of the basic protections of state lawfinal judgments. That is, a state law-based ruling, constitutional or
otherwise, which affirms some claim of right is unreviewable by a federal tribunal and is therefore determinative, while an analogous federal-law-based ruling may subject the rights claimant to further
litigation.36 That state law is stripped of its necessary and proper sovereign status is of little or no moment to critics of the "new judicial
federalism."
Seventh, the critics typically either recognize no distinctions
between the various models of state law-based decisionmaking 3 7 or
they discount such differences. Consequently, they do not appreciate
the possibility of there existing a truly independent (i.e., "up-down" 3 8 )
form of the "new judicial federalism." 39 If this possibility is allowed,
as it has been in practice and theory,' then the concept of federalism
can certainly be squared with independent reliance on state law. That
is, the federalism principle need not be viewed as a utilitarian argu36. A variation of the point in the text is well illustrated by a 1984 Washington religion case,
where a church-state challenge was affirmed on federal first amendment grounds even though the
primary relief sought was under the state constitution. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind,
102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984). Two years later, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case, ironically instructing the state court to consider the matter under its own
constitution. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see
Collins, High Court's Rights-Claims Record: A Challenge to 'New Federalism,' NAT'L L.J., Aug.
31, 1987, at 26, col.1. As of this date, four years after the original state supreme court ruling, a
final judgment has not been obtained. However the Washington high court ultimately decides
this case (and my guess is that a majority will deny the state law claim), the fact remains that had
this issue been resolved initially, much effort and public and private expense could have been
saved. See generally Utter, Ensuring Principled Development of State Constitutional Law:
Responsibilitiesfor Attorneys and Courts, I EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 217, 221 (1988)
(criticizing "the waste of resources" in such cases).
37. See Collins & Galie, supra note 22, at 322-39.
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Maltz, FalseProphet, supra note 5, at 443-49; Maltz, Lockstep Analysis, supra
note 5, at 102-03.
40. See, e.g., Serna v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 239, 707 P.2d 793, 219 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1985); supra note 21
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ment to justify state court activism. Moreover, and contrary to the
critics," when a state court relies on its supreme law to invalidate a
state statute, the federalism principle is implicated. The obvious reason is that, practically speaking, absent adherence to state constitutional law constraints, the citizenry of a state must be content to
accept only those protections conceded to them by another sovereign
acting through the federal judiciary. Because the very institution of
judicial review is anti-majoritarian, it simply will not do to argue that
the federalism principle is not implicated insofar as the contest is
between a state court and a state legislature. Any argument that reallocates the division of power between the nation and its states so as to
deny the retention of "local [constitutional]rule"'42 is itself a false
federalism.4 3
Eighth, a related argument sometimes leveled by the critics is that
independent reliance on state law creates "uniformity problems." One
critic has identified three such "problems:" (1) "where state and federal constitutional laws differ, there will be less certainty as to which
laws apply to whom and individuals will be less certain of the consequences of their actions;" (2) "double protection will result in different
constitutional rights for citizens of different states;" and
(3) "[p]rosecutors and police need to know the rules of the game."'
One obvious reply is that such "problems" are created first and foremost by our dual constitutional system itself and not by judicial interpretation of it. For example, if a state legislature declined to pass a
"victims' rights" measure, otherwise valid under federal law, because
it was inconsistent with a certain state constitutional provision, the
"uniformity problem" would be the same.45 As for different constitutional rights for citizens of different states, this should not be seen as
problematic given federal constitutional minimums. Admittedly, a
person's life or liberty may hang in the constitutional balance of such
diversity, but that same life or liberty may depend as well oh statutory
law provisions which themselves differ from state to state. Moreover,
41. See ag., Maltz, State Court Activism, supra note 5, at 1018-19.
42. Id. at 1018.
43. If the argument advanced in the text were not the case, and if the federalism principle
were not here implicated, then why did a number of the 18th and 19th century state constitutions
(including post-1816 ones) outlaw ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts despite the fact that such acts were already illegal under article 1, section
10 of the federal Constitution?
44. Hudnut, supra note 5, at 92, 93 (footnotes omitted).
45. The same holds true for state executive officials. See Amestoy & Brill, State Constitutions
from the Attorney General'sPerspective: An InstitutionalSchizophrenia, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST.
CONST. L. 229, 230, 233-34 (1988); see also supra note 10.
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I suspect that many more rights, virtually as important to the average
citizen, depend on the common law of contracts, torts and property,
all of which likewise differ from state to state.4 6 Should the uniformity
argument require centralization of those areas of law as well?4 7 And
finally, there is the point that state constitutional diversity demands
the impossible of prosecutors and police. If the state standard is the
higher one, if, say, a state has rejected a "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule or a "public safety exception" to a confessions rule,
then the state rules govern. Where, then, is there any problem in discerning the "rules of the game"? By the logic of the critics, a similar
"problem" would be generated by state statutes which govern police
conduct in the same areas affected by the state constitution. But here
again, the "problem" is readily remedied by reference to the higher
standard.
Finally, the relational focus standard's purported emphasis on the
virtues of judicial restraint ignores or downplays a significant check on
state court power-judicial elections. As Chief Justice William Rehnquist put it: "I think that those who undertake these [state constitutional] 'experiments,' to use Justice Brandeis' term, must be willing to
assume the responsibility for doing so."4 And even before the widely
noted 1986 California judicial retention elections,4 9 a judge of that
state admitted to being quite "frightened about the reactions of the lay
person." 5 By the same token, this electoral fact has itself been held
out as a reason justifying more policymaking latitude for state judges:
46. In this same regard, Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has pointed
out that state common law may likewise be employed to protect individual rights claims, this in
addition to similar claims based on federal or state constitutional law grounds. Kaye, A Midpoint
Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17,
25-27 (1988).
47. For a further elaboration of the diversity point as it pertains to state constitutions, see
Collins, Beyond the "New Federalism," supra note 1, at xxvi n.137 (1984).
48. Remarks of the Chief Justice, Nat'l Conf. of Chief Justices, Williamsburg, Virginia (Jan.
27, 1988), quoted in Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and
DemocraticAccountability: Is There a Crocodilein the Bathtub? 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 46 n.172
(1989).
49. See Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
333 (1988).
50. In 1981, Superior Court Judge Bruce Dodds, speaking at a conference on the "new
judicial federalism," said:
I must admit that I am a little more frightened of Justice Linde's position than Justice
Mosk is. I deal with this on an individual basis. I listen to the police officers and to the
people on the streets. I also have to run for election. The average person just doesn't
understand the distinctions you are making. I am frightened about the reactions of the lay
person. The average person believes the U.S. Supreme Court sets the ultimate standards.
Now you are suggesting that the state courts can go beyond these minimum standards. If
you try to explain that to a layman, you will have a tough time doing it.
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"As elected representatives, like legislators, [state judges] feel less hesitant to offer their policy views than do appointed judges. The manner
of their selection gives state judges a defense against being regarded as
a 'bevy of platonic guardians.' , These and other related points are
ably set out by Justice Robert Utter (who weathered a stormy election
52
challenge) in his contribution to this Symposium.
That judicial elections and state constitutional amendments5 3 do
bring legal realism into the state court chambers is, in one sense, undeniable. That these democratic elements can diminish the appetite for
judicial activism also seems undeniable. These bare bone assertions
notwithstanding, I am not quite sure where they do, or should, leave
us. 54 For example, as an empirical matter, how much do judicial elections actually influence judicial behavior?55 And as a normative matter, how much democratic influence on judicial decisionmaking, either
in affirming or denying rights claims, is desirable or even tolerable?
Without now answering these questions, I think it enough for these
purposes to say that the critics have largely argued around these matters in their efforts to discredit the once "new judicial federalism."
*

*

*:

*

As noted at the outset of this Foreword, the once "new judicial federalism" is certainly vulnerable to criticism. On that score, I too have
voiced 56 criticisms. But on this occasion my point has been to demonstrate, if only in an introductory way, how much of the criticism leveled by the critics is itself vulnerable to attack. What both the critics
and their counterparts need to do most is to move beyond their incesWelsh & Collins, Taking State ConstitutionsSeriously, 14 THE CENTER MAG. 6, 33-34 (Sept.Oct. 1981).
51. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES & LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 118 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988); see also Keyser, State Constitutions
& Theories of JudicialReview: Some Variationson a Theme, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1077, 1080
(1985).
52. Utter, supra note 48.
53. See Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State
ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 43 (1983); May, The Constitutional
Initiative:A Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE STATES 163 (S.Friedelbaum ed. 1988);
May, ConstitutionalAmendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIUS 153 n.1 (1987); Wilkes,
First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills ofRights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223 (1984).
54. For a general discussion of this point, see Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection &
Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555-2220 (1988); Grodin, Developing a Consensus of
Constraint7 A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, id at 1969; Linde, Elective
Judges: Some ComparativeComments, id. at 1995.
55. Consider P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 248-49 (1980).
56. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions,supranote 16; see also Collins & Skover, The
Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 218 n. 115 (1988).
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sant relational focus battles and proceed to discussions of substantive
law. Thus, questions should not be couched in terms of "more or less"
protection, but rather in terms of the soundness of the arguments
presented. For example, should the state be allowed to introduce evidence of a confession illegally obtained so long as it does so for
impeachment purposes? That is a difficult question of constitutional
criminal procedure. In my opinion, the question is best answered by
consideration of the appropriate remedy (perhaps other than the
exclusionary rule) to enforce the underlying right. If the decisions of
the Supreme Court, or for that matter Kentucky courts, shed light on
that analytical point, then resort to them would be desirable-but for
that reason alone.
In short, the critics and their counterparts need to direct more of
their attention to examining state constitutional substantive and procedural law arguments and less time to developing yet more grand relational focus theories of judicial review. Not surprisingly, just such an
approach to law and scholarship is revealing itself in Oregon,5 7 where
the once "new judicial federalism" continues to thrive.

57. See, e.g., Buttler, Oregon's Constitutional Renaissance: Federalism Revisited, 13 VT. L.
REv. 107 (1988); Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privilegesand Immunities" A States Version of
"Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REV. 221 (1988); Schuman, Oregon'sRemedy Guarantee:Article I,
Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35 (1986). See generally A Symposium on
State ConstitutionalRevision, 67 OR. L. REV. 1-238 (1988).

